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Abstract
The design of fair voting rules has been addressed quite often in the
literature. Still, the so-called inverse problem is not entirely resolved. We
summarize some achievements in this direction and formulate explicit open
questions and conjectures.
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1 Introduction
Voting in committees with dissimilar committee members raises the question
of measuring individual power, i.e., the capability to influence a group decision
under a given voting rule. To this end, power indices were introduced in order to
quantify these abilities. Despite the fact that the question for the measurement
of power dates back to the late 18th century, at the very least, there is still a
very active research on power indices. Indeed we believe that this will also be
the case for the next decades, giving a personal answer to a question about the
future of power indices raised by Manfred Holler after finishing the collection
[Holler & Nurmi, 2013]. Its predecessor [Holler, 1982] contains the starting point
of a vital and still widely open question in the area of power indices. To the best of
our knowledge, [Nurmi, 1982] was one of the first papers addressing the nowadays
so-called inverse (power index) problem: Suppose one has a rather precise idea
how the power, measured by a specific power index, should be distributed among
the committee members – Penrose’s square root law may serve as an example.
How to design the voting rule (or mechanism) in order to meet the desired power
distribution as closely as possible?
Of course partial answers have been given during the last 30 years, some
of them quite recently, but we think that a lot remains to be explored. The
aim of this article is to specify this and to propose explicit open questions and
challenging conjectures.
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2 Binary voting rules and the inverse problem
A lot of models for the description of a voting situation in a committee have
been proposed in the literature. Processes of opinion-formation, communication
structures, a priori unions and dependencies have been considered. The decision
space can be multi-dimensional, discrete or continuous. Here we want to stick
to one of the most simple settings, the binary setting. Given a proposal, each
voter can either say “yes” or “no”, represented by 1 and 0, respectively. The
group decision is modeled as a simple game v : 2N → {0, 1} mapping the set of
supporters to either a “yes”- or a “no”-decision (under some additional technical
requirements). Weighted majority games are one of the most used binary voting
rules in practice. Here each voter is assigned a non-negative weight wi. If the
sum of weights of the supporters meets or exceeds a given quota q ∈ R>0 the
group decision is 1 and 0 otherwise.
Next we want to formalize the inverse power index problem. Let C be a class
of voting rules, e.g., simple games or weighted majority games, for n voters, ‖ · ‖
be a vector norm in Rn, σ ∈ Rn≥0 be a vector of the desired power distribution,
and P : C → Rn≥0 be a (positive) power index, e.g., the Shapley-Shubik index
or the Banzhaf index. With this, the inverse problem asks for a minimizer v⋆
of ‖P (v) − σ‖ over all v ∈ C. In practice the determination of an approximate
solution v′, i.e., where the deviation ‖P (v′) − σ‖ is not too much larger as the
minimum possible value ‖P (v⋆)− σ‖, is also sufficient.
Weighted majority games can be designed by choosing an appropriate quota
and appropriate weights. Taking the values of the desired power distribution σ
as weights w and a quota of q = 1
2
, for example (or some suitable function of the
weights), works quite well in some cases, while it does not in others, as we will
see in the next section.
3 Limit results
In its strongest form, the so-called Penrose limit theorem states that, under cer-
tain technical conditions, the limit of the fraction of the power of two players
equals the limit of the fraction of the respective weights. To make things precise,
let W ⊆ R≥0 be a set of weights, N
(0) ( N (1) ( . . . be an infinite increasing
chain of finite non-empty sets, and N =
⋃∞
n=0N
(n). Each voter i ∈ N is assigned
a weight wi ∈ W . With a fixed real number q ∈ (0, 1), we denote by W
(n) the
weighted majority game with voter set N (n), weights wi for all i ∈ N
(n) and quota
q ·
∑
i∈N(n) wi. Given a power index P we say that Penrose’s limit theorem (PLT)
holds for such a chain
(
W(n)
)∞
n=0
, if
lim
n→∞
Pi
(
W(n)
)
Pj(W(n))
=
wi
wj
(1)
for every pair of voters i, j ∈ N with wi, wj 6= 0. We call a player i regular if
there exist constants n0 ∈ N and ε > 0 such that∣∣{h ∈ N (n) | wh = wi}∣∣ · wi∑
h∈N(n) wh
≥ ε (2)
2
for all n ≥ n0, i.e., the relative weight of all voters having the same weight as voter
i does not vanish. We call a chain non-atomic (or oceanic), if lim
n→∞
wi/
∑
h∈N(n) wh =
0 for all i ∈ N , i.e., if each individual weight vanishes.
In [Lindner & Machover, 2004] the authors have proven that PLT holds for
regular players in non-atomic chains for the Shapley-Shubik index with arbitrary
relative quota q and for the Banzhaf index with relative quota q = 1
2
.
Conjecture 1 PLT holds for regular players in non-atomic chains for the Banzhaf
index with arbitrary relative quota q ∈ (0, 1).
In [Kurz et al., 2014] it is shown that the corresponding statement for the
nucleolus as a power index is true.
Research question 2 For which power indices does Conjecture 1 hold?
Looking at the example with one voter of weight 1 and all other voters having
weight 2, we see that, for symmetric power indices, the regularity, of at least
the involved voters i and j, is necessary. This subtlety, caused by divisibility
properties of integers, can be circumvented by replacing the relative limit (1)
with
lim
n→∞
∑
i∈N(n)
∣∣Pi(W(n))− wi∣∣ = 0, (3)
i.e., the limit of the norm-1-difference between weights and power tends to zero.
Given such a limit result for an arbitrary power index, one can conclude the
PLT result for regular players i and j in non-atomic chains. In [Kurz et al., 2014,
Proposition 1] the underlying general proof strategy was applied to obtain the
PLT result for the nucleolus. For the Shapley-Shubik index and non-atomic chains
limit equation (3) was shown in [Neyman, 1982].
Research question 3 For which power indices does limit equation (3) hold for
non-atomic chains?
From a practical point of view, the big drawback of those results is the as-
sumption of an infinite chain of weighted majority games. To obtain effective
bounds for finite games a bit more is needed. And indeed the limit result for the
nucleolus Nuc is based on the inequality
‖Nuc([q;w1, . . . , wn])− (w1, . . . , wn)‖1 ≤
2∆
min(q, 1− q)
, (4)
where ∆ = max1≤i≤nwi, q ∈ (0, 1), w ∈ R≥0, and ‖w‖1 = 1, i.e. where ∆ is
the maximum weight assuming a normalized representation. We remark that ∆
tends to zero in the non-atomic case.
Research question 4 For which power indices do constants α, β, c ∈ R>0 exist,
such that
‖P ([q;w1, . . . , wn])− (w1, . . . , wn)‖1 ≤
c ·∆α
min(q, 1− q)β
(5)
holds for all n ∈ N, q ∈ (0, 1), w ∈ R≥0 with ‖w‖1 = 1 and ∆ = max1≤i≤n wi?
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For the Shapley-Shubik index such a bound may implicitly be contained in
the technical results of [Neyman, 1982].
Conjecture 5 The answer to research question 4 is negative for the Public Good
Index.
Of course we are not only interested in an existence result for such constants,
but want to know them explicitly (and best possible).
Conjecture 6
‖Nuc([q;w1, . . . , wn])− (w1, . . . , wn)‖1 ≤
∆
min(q, 1− q)
(6)
is valid and tight for normalized weights.
So, given such a result and a specific desired power distribution σ, we can
compute an upper bound for the norm-1-error between σ as relative weights and
the resulting power vector without evaluating the power index. This upper bound
may also serve as a termination criterion for heuristic search algorithms for the
inverse problem.
We can also obtain general assertions about the quality of the solution of
taking power as weights in the inverse problem. If the maximum weight is not
too far away from the average weight, i.e., if there exists a constant C such that
relative weights are bounded from above by C · 1
n
, then the norm-1-error is in
O( 1
n
) (for α = 1), i.e., it decreases at least linearly in the number of voters.
The other case, where ∆ does not tend to zero, i.e., if so-called atomic voters
with non-vanishing weights are present, is also studied in the literature. Given
a chain, let us call voters, whose relative weights can be bounded from below
by a positive constant δ > 0, atomic, and those, whose relative weights tend to
zero, oceanic. We assume that all voters are either atomic or oceanic and that
the set A of atomic players is finite. In [Shapiro & Shapley, 1978] it is proven
(cf. Inequality 4.1) that
∣∣SSIi(W(n))− SSIi(W(m))∣∣ ∈ O
(
1
n
)
(7)
for all atomic players i, n < m, assuming that the relative weight of the oceanic
players does not tend too slowly to zero. A precise formula for the limit of the
Shapley-Shubik power of an atomic player is stated too. Similar results, while be-
ing a bit weaker, have been obtained for the Banzhaf index in [Dubey & Shapley, 1979].
Research question 7 For which power indices does the limit
lim
n→∞
Pi
(
W(n)
)
(8)
exist for all atomic players i ∈ A, where A is finite and the relative weights of the
non-atomic players can be upper bounded by C · 1
n
with a constant C > 0?
Conjecture 8 The nucleolus is a positive answer to research question 7.
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Research question 9 Determine exact formulas for the positive answers to re-
search question 7.
For the nucleolus some first results in that direction are obtained in [Galil, 1974].
4 Distribution of power vectors
Assuming σ ∈ Rn≥0 with ‖σ‖1 = 1, the space of the possible desired power dis-
tributions is an n − 1-dimensional unit simplex. Since the number of weighted
majority games or simple games, is finite, not every desired power vector can be
met exactly. Using asymptotic bounds on the number of games one can conclude
a lower bound for a worst case approximation error, which still tends to zero with
increasing n, see [Kurz & Napel, 2014].
Efficient and positive power indices principally map into the n−1-dimensional
unit simplex, so that the question arises whether for large n each desired power
vector can be approximated suitably well by the power vector of a weighted
majority or a simple game. Some of the lesser known power indices satisfy
1
c
· 1
n
≤ Pi(v) ≤ c ·
1
n
for all players i and all simple games v, where c > 0 is
a constant independent from n. The Public Help index, see [Bertini et al., 2008],
is such an example; more can be found in [Kurz, 2014]. As a consequence only
power distributions, where the entries do not differ too much, can be principally
approximated well. For the extreme example (1, 0, . . . , 0) we obtain a best pos-
sible approximation error tending to 2, which is indeed the maximal distance
between two non-negative vectors of sum 1.
For the Banzhaf index such a constant c does not exist. Nevertheless, e.g.,
for the power distribution σ = (0.75, 0.25, 0, . . . , 0) we have ‖Bz(v) − σ‖ ≥ 1
9
for all simple games n, even if n tends to infinity. This example, taken from
[Kurz, 2012b], is based on the seminal work of [Alon & Edelman, 2010]:
Theorem 10 Let n > k be positive integers, ε < 1
k+1
be a positive real, and v
be a simple game on n voters. If
∑n
i=k+1 Bzi(v) ≤ ε, then there exists a simple
game v′ with n− k dummies such that
‖Bz(v)− Bz(v′)‖1 ≤
(2k + 1)ε
1− (k + 1)ε
+ ε. (9)
In other words the Banzhaf vector of a simple game, where most of the power
is concentrated on just k of the n voters, has to be near, in an explicit sense, to
the Banzhaf vector of another k-voter simple game.
In [Kurz, 2014] such inequalities where called Alon-Edelman type results and
indeed obtained for some other power indices besides the Banzhaf index.
Research question 11 For which power indices do Alon-Edelman type results
do exist?
We remark that for the Johnston index, assuming a minor technical condition,
no such result can exist.
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Conjecture 12 The nucleolus, the minimum sum representation index, the Shap-
ley Shubik index and, more generally, p-binomial semivalues are positive answers
to research question 11.
For practical non-approximability computations the concrete bounds are of
importance as well. The right hand side of (9) could indeed be decreased to
(2k + 2)ε in [Kurz, 2014] and we ask for further improvements and worst case
examples.
Conjecture 13 For σn = (0.75, 0.25, 0, . . . , 0) ∈ Rn≥0 and for each simple game
v we have ‖Bz(v)− σn‖1 ≥
14
37
and ‖ SSI(v)− σn‖1 ≥
1
3
.
Conjecture 14 For each σ ∈ Rn≥0 with ‖σ‖1 = 1 and n ≥ 3 there exists a
weighted majority game v with ‖ SSI(v)− σn‖1 ≤
1
3
.
What about the nucleolus and other power indices? Are the worst-case ex-
amples unique? What happens when we consider only purely oceanic games?
With respect to the latter question, we consider the power distribution ψn =
1
2n−1
· (2, . . . , 2, 1). In [Kurz & Napel, 2014] the inequality
‖P ([q;ψn])− ψn‖1 ≥
2
2n− 1
·
n− 1
n
∈ Θ
(
1
n
)
(10)
was shown for all symmetric, positive and efficient power indices P for an arbitrary
relative quota q. So for this special sequence of desired power distributions,
taking the desired power vector as weights, yields an Ω(1/n)-error, which is still
considerably large for medium sized constitutions like, e.g., n = 27 or n = 28.
Additionally, the authors solved the inverse power index problem for ψn and
the Banzhaf index. It turned out that within the class of weighted majority
games, taking the optimal solution, the lower bound of (10) could be decreased
by a small factor only. To the contrary, there exist exact solutions within the
class of simple games for 6 ≤ n ≤ 18 voters.
Conjecture 15 There exists a constant c > 0 such that ‖Bz(v)− ψn‖1 ≥
c
n
for
all n ∈ N≥2 and all weighted majority games v.
Conjecture 16 For all n ≥ 6 there exists a simple game v such that Bz(v) = ψn.
Research question 17 Does there exist a sequence of desired power distribu-
tions σn ∈ Rn≥0 with ‖σ
n‖1 = 1 and σ
n
i ∈ O(1/n) for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n such that
‖Bz(v)− σn‖1 ∈ Ω(1/n) for all weighted majority (or simple) games v?
It seems that for the Banzhaf index there are some regions near the boundary
of the unit simplex which can not be achieved as Banzhaf vectors of simple games.
In the interior of the unit simplex the worst case distance to a Banzhaf vector of
a weighted majority game is conjectured to be of order 1
n
.
Research question 18 Can we obtain more structural results on the set of
achievable Banzhaf vectors?
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To make thinks more precise, we state a few of the known results. Let ηi denote
the number of swings of player i, i.e., the Banzhaf vector is proportional to the
vector η = (η1, . . . , ηn) of swings. The minimum and the maximum number of to-
tal swings, i.e., n ≤ ‖η‖1 ≤
(⌊
n
2
⌋
+ 1
)
·
(
n
⌊n2 ⌋+1
)
, are well known. Additionally, the
ηi are either all odd or all even numbers. If the underlying game is decisive, then
the ηi are all even and ηi − ηj is divisible by 4, see e.g. [Dubey & Shapley, 1979].
Of course the corresponding questions can be stated for other power indices
too.
5 Algorithmic approaches
The first algorithms that were proposed for the inverse power index problem were
heuristics (mainly hill-climbing and local-search), see e.g. [Kurz & Napel, 2014].
Those heuristics are usually quite fast and produce small approximation errors on
practical instances. Given the results from the previous section, a fundamental
problem arises. Those methods do not provide a priori or a posteriori bounds on
the achievable approximation error, which indeed may be large.
Conceptionally the easiest exact and general approach is based on exhaustive
enumeration of a given class of voting games. For each game the power distri-
bution, according to the chosen power index, and its corresponding distance to
the desired power distribution can be computed easily. Taking the game with the
smallest obtained distance solves the inverse problem exactly. Exhaustively gen-
erating weighted majority games, or one of its super classes, is not that hard, when
the number of voters is rather small. For the class of so-called complete simple
games there is a well known parameterization theorem, so that these games can be
generated efficiently, see e.g. [Kurz & Tautenhahn, 2013]. Since for n ≤ 7 only
few complete simple games are non-weighted, checking complete simple games
for weightedness, see e.g. [Taylor & Zwicker, 1999] for several such algorithms, is
computationally feasible and was indeed done in the literature. For n = 8 the
fraction of weighted majority games within the class of complete simple games
is roughly 1
7
and roughly 1
285
for n = 9. Thus more direct algorithms for the
enumeration of weighted majority games are needed. Notwithstanding the re-
cent progress, see [Kartak et al., 2014, de Keijzer et al., 2014, Kurz, 2012a], the
number of weighted majority games is known up to n = 9 voters only.
Research question 19 Determine the number of weighted majority and com-
plete simple games for n = 10 voters.
Due to the super exponential growth of both complete simple and weighted
majority games we conjecture that the corresponding numbers for n = 11 will not
be determined exactly in the next decade. Since no intermediate lower bounds
for approximability are computed, the application of exhaustive enumeration al-
gorithms for the inverse problem is rather constrained.
Recently, algorithms for both the Banzhaf and the Shapley-Shubik index have
been designed that can achieve a sufficiently accurate approximation with running
polynomial time, in terms of the number of voters times a factor depending on the
7
desired approximation quality, see [De et al., 2012b, O’Donnell & Servedio, 2011,
De et al., 2012a].
Research question 20 Develop approximation algorithms for the inverse power
index problem for other power indices besides the Banzhaf and the Shapley-Shubik
index.
Besides the tailor-made approaches also integer linear programming tech-
niques have been applied. For the Banzhaf and the Shapley-Shubik index an
ILP formulation was stated in [Kurz, 2012b]. Describing an underlying counting
structure of most of the known power indices, more such formulations were stated
in [Kurz, 2014].
Research question 21 Develop a computationally feasible integer linear pro-
gramming approach for the inverse problem for the nucleolus and the minimum
sum representation index.
Given the information which coalition of a simple or weighted majority game
is winning in an ILP formulation, it is easy to state the Shapley-Shubik power
of a voter by a precise formula for example. This is different for the two power
indices mentioned in research question 21. In principle, the nucleolus can be
described as the solution of a single but tremendously sized linear program, so
that the dual linear program can be used to obtain such a formula within an ILP.
See [Freixas & Kurz, 2014] for an application of this technique in the context of
cooperative game theory. While we did not try this approach, we expect it to be
computationally infeasible for rather small n.
Still the current optimization approaches for the inverse power index problem
are limited to, say, n = 15 voters, which is far beyond what can be achieved by
exhaustive enumeration but not completely satisfactory.
Research question 22 Develop practical hybrid algorithms, which can solve the
inverse power index problem routinely for up to, say, 30 voters, while giving
reasonable a posteriori non-approximability bounds.
6 Conclusion
We have argued that a satisfactory solution of the inverse power index problem
needs further progress with respect to
(1) the so-called limit results, which are currently mainly known for a very few
power indices only;
(2) our understanding of the distribution of the attainable power vectors within
the unit simplex;
(3) algorithmic solution approaches.
Indeed a lot needs to be done.
Citing several contemporary papers, we have a well justified hope, that there
will be further progress in that direction during the next decades. This adds to
8
the revelation of properties of power indices. However, for the application and
the understanding of the political process, the question for the most appropriate
decision rules is even more important than the hunt for the right index.
In order to encourage research on the broader context of the inverse problem,
we have listed several research questions and explicit conjectures, which deserve
to be either proven or falsified.
To answer the question of the title, I indeed believe that we are ready to
design voting games for the inverse problem in the binary setting, but still more
research is needed.
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